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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
The Curse of Windfall Income: How Foreign Aid and Natural Resource Dependence 
Constrains Growth
by 
Adams Bailey Nager
Master of Political Economy and Public Policy
Washington University in St. Louis, 2013
Professor Norman Schofield, Chair
Literature exists on two ʻcurses,ʼ the natural resource curse and the curse of foreign aid, 
which limit growth in developing nations. At their core, both the natural resources curse 
and the curse of aid derive from the same root cause- the curse of windfall income. The 
windfall curse is a macroeconomic side-effect that negates the positive effects of 
unearned capital by raising domestic prices and lowering competitiveness. While 
windfall income creates growth in a countries service sector, it represses growth in the 
manufacturing sector. These trends help explain the inability of both foreign aid and 
natural resources to fuel sustained growth in windfall income-dependent economies. 
 
vi
Introduction
# Developing countries face a strange paradox. Natural resources, which would be 
logically expected to provide capital for rapid economic expansion, frequently end up 
doing more harm than good. This phenomenon, which has been examined extensively 
by economists and political scientists, is commonly known as the resource curse. 
# The resource curse is not the only illness to affect developing economies. 
Foreign aid can also paradoxically set a country back. Foreign aid displays many of the 
same basic symptoms of the resource curse, including limited growth, incentives for 
irresponsible political actions, and low competitiveness abroad. In fact, the two curses 
are so similar that they should be considered the same affliction- the curse of reliance 
on unearned capital to generate development, or the curse of windfall income. This 
paper attempts to illustrate the similarities between the natural resource and foreign aid 
curses, identify the driving mechanism behind the curse of windfall income, and 
empirically demonstrates the dangers of the two curses and the similarities between 
them. 
# In essence, both foreign aid and natural resources are gifts to a developing 
economy. A natural resource gift derives from nature. A country that is endowed with 
easily extracted minerals has a huge pool of potential income which they can choose 
how quickly to use. The extraction process has very little interaction with the non-
resource sector of the economy, especially in poor countries where almost all of the 
skilled labor and capital needed for extraction comes from abroad. Developing countries 
endowed with natural resources court international corporations, typically from either 
China, Europe, or the United States, to provide this labor and capital. 
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# Discovering and exploiting natural resources, such as oil, can generate incredible 
amounts of income. Increasing production, however, typically results in stagnation or 
contraction of non-resource export sectors. Natural resource exportation inflates a 
nationʼs currency, making domestically produced goods less competitive in international 
markets. This process is known as Dutch Disease. 
# Aid functions similarly. While oil and other resources can be classified as gifts 
from nature, aid is a gift from first-world donors. Influx of government revenue is 
expected to boost the performance of the economy. Much like oil, donated goods and 
funds from abroad are not earned by an economy. Western donors either produce 
goods and ship them to poor recipient nations or send money to furnish public goods.  
While this encourages productivity in Western economies, it floods the recipient country 
with goods that are essentially free. Inflows discourage manufacturing by negatively 
affecting a countyʼs competitiveness. Effects on the countryʼs economy can be 
significant. 
# Neither aid nor resource income are tied to an economyʼs productive capacity. 
Rather, foreign aid and natural resource boons can be considered windfalls. In this 
paper, I argue that both aid and resources are ʻcursedʼ because neither are earned. 
Windfall income creates adverse macroeconomic effects that limit competitiveness. 
Export-oriented non-resource sectors such as manufacturing shrink due to high 
domestic prices and currency overvaluation, while non-tradable goods such as services 
see steady growth fueled by an artificially large supply of domestic wealth. 
# In the remainder of this paper, I will define windfall income, review the literature 
on the effects of both aid and resources on an economy, and argue why the curse of 
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foreign aid and the natural resource curse should be treated as the same disease. I 
then analyze possible mechanisms by which windfall capital inhibits growth and identify 
which mechanism fits the specifications that would define the curse of windfall income. I 
test these theories empirically and then conclude. 
Section I: The Curse of Windfall Income
# Windfall income can be defined as income that does not derive from the efforts of 
domestic labor, land, and capital. Most windfall income takes the form of either foreign 
aid inflows or natural resource rents.1 For many resource economies, foreign companies 
provide the capital and skilled labor to extract resources. Most inputs to the industry are 
produced abroad, meaning that the resource sector has only a tangential relationship 
with the remainder of the economy.2 Similarly, aid is frequently given either in the form 
of internationally produced goods or in funds to provide localized services such as 
health and education. These goods do not help productivity inside the recipient country, 
but merely provide countries with more goods. Such aid can be instrumental in 
providing much needed resources to the poor and in improving the standard of living but 
do not, however, translate to a stronger or more productive export economy. Aid 
strategies such as capital goods or expert consultants who work to increase domestic 
productivity should not be grouped into this category, as this aid aims to increase 
productivity within the country instead of merely providing goods. 
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1 Remittances also fit the characteristics of windfall income. However, remitted income is usually to small too factor 
seriously into this discussion. Furthermore, they are not controlled by the government but by individuals, so 
government incentives are not skewed by these transactions. Rajan and Subramanian (2005) dismiss economic 
effects of remittances, saying that levels of remittances naturally decline when the exchange rate is overvalued. 
2 Chistina Wood (2011) finds in her World Bank report on growth and jobs in MENA countries that oil sector was  
major engine of growth in many countries, but growth resulted in negligible job creation. 
# The difference between earned and windfall income can be illustrated by 
comparing the economies of Botswana and Angola, both of which are heavily 
dependent on natural resources. When resource extraction requires significant 
investment, infrastructure, and labor from within the country, these resource rents 
cannot be considered windfalls but a product of a successful domestic enterprise. 
Integration with the resource sector leads to more robust growth in the non-resource 
sector which results in a more healthy, diverse economy. This is the case in Botswana, 
where much of the economy revolves around mining diamonds. The mining industry is 
highly reliant on local labor and investment to fuel production. Botswanaʼs economy has 
grown steadily since 1980 and is one of the only nations in Africa that can truly be 
considered a success story. While Botswana is still poor, has high income inequality, 
and is overly reliant on its diamonds, it has experienced high rates of steady growth not 
typically seen in countries reliant on resources.3 More importantly, despite high levels of 
diamond production, the non-resource export sectors have not been seriously affected 
by Dutch Disease.4 Former Botswana president Mogae stated: “For our people, every 
diamond purchase represents food on the table; better living conditions; better 
healthcare; safe drinking water; more roads to connect our remote communities and 
much more.”5 
# Neighboring Angola is also highly reliant on natural resource income, yet non-
resource sectors are not nearly as involved in the production of resources as in 
4
3 "CIA - The World Factbook." Welcome to the CIA Web Site — Central Intelligence Agency. Web. 21 Dec. 2011. 
<cia.gov>.
4 Makochekanwa
5 Former President Mogae of Botswana, 7th June 2006, cited in Makochekanwa
Botswana. While diamonds in Botswana are an export, oil in Angola is a windfall. The 
Angolan state oil company, Sonangol, both regulates and administers the oil industry. 
The company relies on contracts with large multinational corporations to provide inputs 
for extracting and delivering oil to market. To attain these valuable contracts, 
multinationals pay large, undisclosed signing fees which enrich elites but are hidden 
from citizens. Government income is used to subsidize specific goods produced by 
fellow elites, creating a system of cronyism that benefits only a few.6 
# Resources from Botswana must be used in part to pay local laborers and support 
domestic producers of inputs to the mining industry. Production of diamonds not only 
generates income for elites but positively affects all levels of the economy. In Angola, 
the profits of oil are controlled by the ruling elites, and the industry is shrouded in 
secrecy. Most Angolans never experience benefits from the valuable resource that the 
country controls. 
# Resources rents allow the government to maintain stable rule. Furthermore, 
production efforts by poor Angolans are discouraged by the crippling effects of Dutch 
Disease, which makes goods produced within the country less competitive compared to 
foreign goods. The result is intense income inequality. Angolaʼs GDP per capita in 2011 
was estimated at $5,090 in current US dollars, yet the top 10% of earners controlled 
44.7% of the countryʼs income and 40.5% of the population lives below the poverty 
line.7 
5
6 Ramos, Angola’s Oil
7 "CIA - The World Factbook." Welcome to the CIA Web Site — Central Intelligence Agency. Web. 21 Dec. 2011. 
<cia.gov>.
# The differences between Botswana and Angola illustrate the difference between 
earned and windfall income. In Botswana, the entire economy works towards diamond 
production. Resource rents help develop Botswanaʼs economy across sectors and 
income groups. In Angola, the average citizen has very little interaction with the oil 
sector. Production is reliant on foreign capital and labor, not on local labor nor 
domestically produced inputs, allowing the Angolan government to perpetuate an 
autocratic system where elites claim most of the countryʼs wealth. 
Effects of Windfall Income
# It stands to reason that windfall income would supply a country with the tools to 
develop and create economic growth. Both foreign aid and natural resources, however, 
have systematically failed to produce positive economic effects. The curses also carry 
negative political consequences. As Ross (1999) states: “Windfalls produce myopic 
disorders among policymakers that can weaken state institutions that are necessary to 
foster long-term economic development.”8 This prediction plays out in the literature, with 
authors finding that both aid and oil leads to a decline in the quality of economic 
institutions. 
# Numerous papers have demonstrated that no robust association exists between 
aid and growth. Burnside and Dollar (2000) is a pivotal work that shows that aid only 
benefits an economy in the presence of good institutions. This reinforces the concept of 
ʻSelectivity,ʼ which hypothesizes that windfall income can only help economies with 
sound governance. Since then, a plethora of studies including Easterly (2003), Easterly, 
6
8 Ross (1999). p308
Levine, and Roodman (2004), Hansen and Tarp (2001), Roodman (2004), and Rajan 
and Subramanian (2005) find that even in countries with good policies, aid does not 
cause growth. Additionally, natural resources have also been empirically shown to 
generate unsubstantial growth.9#
# Windfall income is also empirically shown to cause degradation of quality 
governance. Excess income allows governments to exercise more control over 
populations. Djankov and Montalvo (2008) empirically demonstrate that a 1% increase 
in incoming Foreign Aid reduces a countryʼs score on a 10-point index of democracy by 
between 0.6 and one point. The same paper found a .02 fall in the index for 1% 
increase in oil rents. Djankov and Montalvo conclude bluntly, “Aid is a bigger curse than 
oil.”10 Brautigam and Knack (2004) find that even when controlling for GDP per capita 
and violence, aid has a significant, negative effect on democratic institutions.11
# While the existing literature discusses the curse of aid and the natural resource 
curse separately, the two curses are in essence very similar and should by all regards 
be considered the same disease. Both have very similar effects in universally lowering 
economic growth and contributing to deteriorating political institutions. Moreover, while 
aid and resource income are realized in very different ways, they both supply large 
amounts of unearned capital to governments. 
# To infer that the curses are identical, the underlying mechanism that causes 
windfall income to constrain economic growth must be identified. If the mechanism is 
7
9 See Gelb (1998)
10 Djankov and Montalvo (2008)
11 James Vreeland argues that aid is endogenous to failing regimes, as the countries that request funds 
from the IMF and other institutions are the countries where the money is needed for elites to stay in 
power, creating a selection bias. 
identical for both aid and natural resources, it can be inferred that the two curses are 
actually the same curse: the curse of windfall income. Such a conclusion could radically 
alter approaches to the study of both foreign aid and natural resources and their effects 
on growth.
SECTION II: Identifying a Mechanism
# The question being asked is very specific. There is a mechanism sparked by 
windfall income that serves to ubiquitously prevent growth in a diverse set of 
economies. The mechanism increases in severity as windfall income becomes a more 
substantial component of a countryʼs income. Furthermore, the effects are not closely 
tied to variation in factors exogenous to the level of windfall income like institutional 
quality. The mechanism should have comparable effects for both foreign aid and natural 
resources. Finally, the mechanism should center around a negative consequence of 
windfall income, not just one that negates a portion of the benefits. 
# Conceptually, windfall income could negate growth in two ways. First, windfall 
income could be the equivalent of a sugar pill- a treatment that has absolutely no effect 
on the outcome. It is hard to argue, however, that excess capital has no benefits. 
Excess capital can be used to procure public goods, increase economic activity, invest 
in industry, and provide welfare for the poor. Even where inflows are primarily 
dominated by elites, benefits should trickle down to the nationʼs poorest and elicit at 
least a marginal effect. 
# The second explanation is that windfall income, while helpful, has a deleterious 
side effect that negates any benefit the initial treatment might have. This is a much more 
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feasible solution. While there are obvious benefits to what is essentially receiving free 
money, there is a roughly equal but opposite effect that eliminates the benefits of 
windfall income. 
# In the next section, I examine two classes of mechanism that could cause a 
negative externality substantial enough to negate growth. The first derives from 
distortions to political incentives caused by capital that does not derive from the labors 
of the governed. The second class of mechanisms are economic. Excess capital from 
outside the economy can heavily skew the internal economy through Dutch Disease, 
which makes domestic manufactures less competitive compared to goods produced 
abroad. I describe the effects that these two mechanisms could have on economies, 
then analyze which phenomenon is more robust in its ability to constrain growth in 
nations dependent on windfall income in a manner that matches the observed effects of 
both the resource curse and the curse of aid. 
Unknowns
! It could also be argued that foreign aid and natural resources could potentially be 
harmful through unknowns. Fluctuations of world resources prices and variation in aid 
donations from first-world nations means that a country dependent on either aid or 
resources cannot ever be fully confident about the value of inflows in the next period. 
While this effect is heavily discussed in the literature, the overall effects are not 
substantial and I reject them as a possible cause of the curse of windfall income.
 # Poor countries dependent on aid are at the whims of foreign donors. If first-world 
economies decide not to provide as much aid, government budgets and consequently 
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the public goods they fund can fluctuate wildly. Additionally, the unknown quantity of 
foreign aid can produce a moral hazard effect. Donors give primarily based on need, so 
if a country digs itself into a hole it can credibly count on foreign donors for assistance. 
An understanding that spending in the present period will not seriously constrain 
spending in the future compromises incentives to use money responsibly. 
# The first component of the resource curse is vulnerability to market fluctuations. 
Every country engaging in international trade is vulnerable to changes in supply and 
demand to some degree. Countries that rely heavily on one commodity for export are 
markedly more vulnerable. Fluctuations in markets can drastically raise or lower a 
countryʼs income with little notice, which can be extremely disruptive. 
# In the late 20th century, oil prices were highly unstable. From 1970 to 1980, oil 
prices shot up from less than $15/barrel to over $65/barrel. Ten years later prices had 
fallen back down to 1970 levels. Countries dependent on oil were frequently unable to 
pay for half-finished  projects or public goods due to plummeting oil prices. Many 
accrued severe debt. On the other hand, when oil prices are on the rise, unexpected 
excess capital encourages wanton spending among top officials.12 
! Effects caused by unknown future prices and donation levels, however, are not 
strong enough to provide a feasible explanation for the failures of natural resources and 
foreign aid to increase growth. At most, these mechanisms are capable only of 
lessening positive effects caused by windfall incomes. They could by no means act as a 
viable externality capable of rendering windfall income ineffective. Thus, despite 
10
12 “History of crude oil prices." Illinois Oil and Gas Association. Web. 21 Dec. 2011. <http://www.ioga.com/Special/
crudeoil_Hist.htm >
unknowns receiving considerable attention in the literature, I choose to dismiss these 
effects as unsubstantial and irrelevant.13
Section III: Political Effects 
! Windfall income usually passes through the hands of the government. In the 
case of foreign aid, incoming aid flows often make up the majority of a governmentʼs 
budget. In 1999, 17 countries in Sub Saharan Africa relied on aid for over 50% of 
government expenditures (with 10 more over 25% reliant).14 Likewise, resource 
production is heavily taxed. In many countries dependent on oil, the government 
receives little revenue from anything other than the oil sector. Logically, windfall income 
has the potential to significantly alter a governments behavior. Increased levels of 
windfall income could potentially allow the state to increase control over citizens and 
lead to the deterioration of government institutions. Alternatively, windfall income can 
also destabilize nations and lead to internal conflicts. While specific distortions to the 
system vary between foreign aid and natural resources, the underlying mechanisms are 
similar. Both aid and oil can either increase or decrease the stability of a regime. 
Political effects of Natural Resources
# States built upon oil income, while frequently autocratic, are often quite stable. 
Many oil-states show little variation over time on standard measures of democratization. 
Natural resources can make substantial contributions to regime stability, which can 
11
13 This conclusion mirrors evaluation by Ross (1999), which also dismisses the effects of unknowns and market 
fluctuations as unrelated to the root causes of the resource curse.
14 Brautigum and Knack (2004), Table 1 
provide a better habitat for economic prosperity. However, windfall income can also lead 
stable regimes to solidify and become more autocratic. 
# A government that receives substantial income from natural resources can use 
those resources to generate benefits for their citizens. Oil revenue allows the state to 
lower taxes and improve the quality of public goods such as schools, hospitals, and 
public works. The government can also spend the money to decrease unemployment 
and keep people satisfied. Higher spending and lower taxes can appease groups who 
might otherwise oppose or revolt against the state. Lower risk of revolt leads to 
increased stability. This process is referred to as the Rentier effect. 
# Stability is also enhanced through Asset Specificity.15 Oil income is fixed and 
immobile. If a successful revolt did occur, the current owners of resources would be 
unlikely to retain ownership- resource assets would naturally be the first thing 
redistributed should an overthrow of a government occur. Because of this, elites with 
income tied to the resource sector have strong incentives to support the incumbent 
regime and to invest in maintaining the status quo. This pattern of stability is very visible 
in many oil economies. In Saudi Arabia, for example, Saudi elites are heavily invested in 
the success of the state. However, such stalwart support has led to little pressure on 
Saudi Arabia to reform policies or allow citizens increased freedoms. While Saudi Arabia 
is stable, its stability has allowed it to pass religiously conservative policies that are 
considered backwards in the west. 
# Alternatively, natural resource income can just as easily have a destabilizing 
effect. The Rentier effect only appeases citizens when all citizens are receiving goods 
12
15 Boix (2003)
and services from the government. If income is not distributed equitably, or if certain 
groups feel like they are being excluded or not treated fairly, a Grievance effect occurs. 
Frequently groups who feel unfairly excluded from enjoying natural resource wealth will 
undertake armed conflict to try and take their fair share by force.16 
# Natural resources also means there is more value to ruling the country. While 
risks facing potential rebels are high, so too is the reward of controlling billions of dollars 
of resource wealth. Resource wealth does not depend on the overall prosperity of the 
country. Where the value of controlling a non-resource economy could be substantially 
diminished by a destructive civil war, instability and conflict does not decrease the value 
of an oil-field. This makes insurgency a lucrative proposition in resource rich countries. 
# Rebels can also find allies in unlikely places. Because any owner of immobile 
natural resources must live with whichever side wins a civil war, rebel factions can 
garner funding by exploiting the owners of resources. Owners are pushed to hedge their 
bets by supporting all factions in a civil war to ensure that they retain ownership after 
the conflict concludes. If an owner refuses to pay, rebels can target immobile resource 
production centers, sabotage productivity and cause extreme damage. Exploitation can 
provide rebel groups with vital resources to carry on a crusade against the government.
# Natural resources can either help a government maintain stability or provide 
incentives to incite a rebellion. Which effect dominates depends heavily on the quality of 
institutions within the state. Where institutions are weak and governments are corrupt or 
ineffective, Grievance effects caused by dissatisfaction over the allocation of resource 
rents supersede the positive Rentier effects. In relatively developed countries, civil wars 
13
16 Morrison (2012)
will be harder to start and less likely to succeed. In underdeveloped countries where the 
government has paid little attention to large components of the population, guerilla 
warfare and the exploitation of resource owners is common and effective.
Aidʼs Effect on Stability
! Like with natural resources, foreign aid inflows can have either a stabilizing or 
destabilizing effect on governments. Many of the mechanisms by which stability or 
instability are realized are identical to the mechanisms that exist in resource-rich states. 
# First, aid also triggers the Rentier and Grievance effect. Aid money can help 
provide many basic public goods, including better public health initiatives, education, 
and infrastructure. Spending, ideally focused on the neediest segments of the 
population helps governments protect their people. 
# Aid also has the power to encourage countries to enact reforms that help 
liberalize markets and improve a countryʼs economy. Often, organizations such as the 
World Bank and the IMF offer aid to countries that is conditional on political and 
economic reforms. Countries liberalize in order to meet criterion for valuable inflows of 
aid. Furthermore, conditionality effects can provide disincentives against coups or 
rebellions if donor countries can make credible commitments to cut off funding in the 
event of a military take-over or a civil war.17
# On the other hand, aid can create incentives that lead to poorer institutions and 
instability. Like with natural resources, the Grievance effect can take hold when aid is 
not spent well. Aid frequently distorts a governmentʼs spending through a moral hazard 
14
17 See Dunning (2004)
effect. Governments can count on foreign donors to bail them out if they do not use 
funds responsibly in the current period, creating incentives to use the money fecklessly 
or for self-serving purposes. Moreover, by maintaining at least some amount of visible 
poverty and hunger, a country can increase aid inflows in future periods. When this 
happens a Grievance effect will occur. Misuse of funds, specifically those intended to 
provide goods for subjugated or oppressed groups, provides a visible example of a 
governmentʼs corruption, and can lead dissatisfied citizens to support an armed 
rebellion against the government. 
# Governments themselves are not the only ones to be corrupted by incoming aid. 
Militaries of recipient nations are tempted by large amounts of capital under government 
control. To avoid coups, leaders of aid-dependent countries appease their militaries by 
channeling large portions of aid into defense-related spending. In his book, The Bottom 
Billion, Paul Collier estimates that 40% of military budgets in Africa are funded by 
foreign aid.18 Coups in African economies are still frequent. When a coup occurs, 
western powers too often continue aid transfers to the new government. Foreign aid is 
seen as support for the new regime, and validates the coupʼs legitimacy on an 
international stage.
# Furthermore, the ability of aid conditionality to either exact policy change or to 
discourage civil war is unclear. There are countless examples of countries repeatedly 
promising to enact reforms in exchange for aid, only to renege on their commitment as 
soon as the aid has been received. Likewise, civil wars or other conflicts tend to induce 
more aid flow, not less. Donors react to human rights tragedies with large donations 
15
18 Collier, Paul. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are failing and What Can Be Done about It. Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 2007. Print. p103
meant to ensure the well-being of those displaced by conflict. Montinola (2007) shows 
that aid conditionality only works in countries where institutional quality is already high. 
Thus, for the majority of aid recipients, conditionality has limited ability to encourage 
good policies.
# Like natural resources, high levels of foreign aid creates incentives for civil war. 
More aid means more to fight over. Attempts by different groups to control incoming 
resources results in bloody conflict. In other cases such as in Somalia, factions fighting 
civil wars actively prolong a crisis to ensure the continued flow of disaster relief money 
into the country.
# An extensive literature exists on whether foreign aid promotes democracy or 
gives stability to recipient governments. Like with natural resources, mechanisms for 
aidʼs effects on stability hinge on the quality of institutions in the recipient country. 
William Easterly proposes that institutional quality determines whether aid will cause 
growth, referred to as ʻSelectivityʼ in the literature.19 Empirical results on selectivity are 
mixed and inconclusive, as discussed previously.20
Perspectives on Political Effects
# Levels of windfall income seem relatively well equipped to explain a lack of 
positive political change. In the best case scenario, windfall income freezes institutions 
in place by providing elites with incentives to keep the status quo. The only mechanism 
discussed that could actually move governments toward improved policies is aid 
16
19 Easterly (2002).  Cartel of Good Intentions
20 Burnside and Dollar (2000), Easterly (2004), etc. 
conditionality (which has a dubious empirical record at best). In the worst case, windfall 
income either encourages a deterioration of political institutions or actively increases 
incentives for civil war. 
# Windfall incomeʼs ability to move government policy farther towards autocracy is 
disturbing. Windfalls enable the government to take away individual rights and take 
increased control over the economy. Because windfall income is generated 
independently of the welfare of citizens, governments can continue to receive funding 
regardless of how citizens are treated. As such, rentier states face low social pressure 
to reform economic policies.21 Given donorʼs lamentable inability to maintain credible 
commitments to the conditionality of aid, repressive economic policies are unlikely to 
decrease windfall income. Investments in regime stability are frequently not beneficial to 
economic performance, with elites “jealously guarding the status quo instead of 
promoting development.”22
# Political effects, however, do not necessarily match the problem that the curse of 
windfall income presents. While becoming more democratic is positively correlated with 
economic growth, countries with non-democratic forms of governments are certainly 
capable of economic growth, especially when endowed with large amounts of capital. 
Given the variation of institutional quality among countries receiving windfall income, 
significant variation in results would be expected based on institutions. Neither the 
curses of aid nor resources, however, have relatively observable ʻSelectivityʼ associated 
with growth failures, implying that the actual underlying cause of limited growth is not 
17
21 Shambayati (1994)
22 Mahdavy (1970) p443
strongly associated with levels of political freedoms. Furthermore, if increased chances 
of instability is the side-effect that constrains the benefits of windfall income, there 
should be noticeable divides between states that experience civil war and those who do 
not. This divide does not occur and controlling for violence does not negate results. 
# In addition, while the effects of aid and resources here are similar, they are not 
homogenous. Aid and oil have comparable, but distinct, influences on political 
incentives and outcomes. Given the similarity in the negative effects exhibited in both 
economies reliant on aid and resources, a mechanism that affects both aid and oil in the 
same way is necessary. 
# I conclude that while windfall income has significant effects on a governmentʼs 
actions and policies, these distortions cannot adequately explain the curses of 
resources and aid. The effects experienced by the two are too distinct and are reliant on 
an external variable- institutional quality. Political and institutional effects, while 
significant, are overstated in the literatures addressing both foreign aid and natural 
resources. 
Section IV: Economic Effects
! Dutch Disease is a serious affliction for many oil economies. The disease has 
two components. First, a focus on natural resources tends to draw labor and capital 
away from the non-resource sectors, lowering productivity and competitiveness. This 
effect is not seen in many developing economies that discover natural resources, 
particularly oil, because in many cases foreign capital and labor almost exclusively 
provides the inputs for resource extraction. Poor, developing nations have neither the 
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educated labor force nor the capital to take on such projects. Even if they did they would 
lack all important access to foreign markets. Nations contract foreign companies, 
typically from the US, western Europe, or China, to extract the oil, then retain a sizable 
portion of the profits through taxes. Therefore, for developing nations, I do not consider 
this first aspect of Dutch Disease to be a serious economic malady. 
# The second symptom of Dutch Disease is a more serious threat to developing 
nations. When countries export sizable quantities of resources, the value of their 
currency appreciates on international markets. This makes international goods less 
expensive compared to domestically produced goods, and makes domestically 
produced exports less competitive on international markets.
# Results of Dutch Disease in oil economies are readily observable. In many 
economies dependent on oil, lavish projects and public works provide jobs to the public. 
Leaders and elites amass huge fortunes which purchase expensive imports. Non-
resource sectors are usually dominated by services, with wages reliant on the money 
the elites have earned from exporting resources. What is lacking, however, are 
domestic jobs producing basic manufactures or tradable agricultural products.
# In an economy where Dutch Disease has significantly altered the value of the 
stateʼs currency, domestically manufactured goods are no longer able to compete with 
cheaper imports. The countryʼs economy has a comparative advantage of producing oil. 
Because so little domestic labor goes into the production process, most workers are left 
with few economically viable options other than providing non-exportable services to the 
owners of resource wealth. 
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# Governments sometimes try to fight Dutch Disease by subsidizing production of 
manufactures in order to make industries competitive. In Angola, these subsidies were 
given to elites as a form of patronage, making a few specific industries competitive to 
keep powerful individuals allied with the government. Venezuela adopted more 
egalitarian policies to support infant industries, yet manufactures subsidized with oil 
wealth still never became viable. The government ended up paying failing companies to 
stay in business to prevent widespread unemployment. 
# Countries that grow on the back of natural resource frequently have a highly 
unequal income distribution. Equatorial Guinea has seen impressive growth fueled by 
increased oil production since 1993, with GDP/capita propelled to $36,600 in 2010 (the 
highest in Sub-Saharan Africa).23 The wealth, however, reaches only the top tier of 
society. In 2006, 77% of the population were living under the poverty line despite GDP 
per capita levels above those in Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom.24 Similar 
conditions are seen in resource-based economies across the world.
# The effect of Dutch Disease is readily apparent in Gabon. The country of just 
over a million people is one of Africaʼs top producers of oil. Libreville, Gabonʼs capital, is 
a modern looking city with a thriving service sector and substantial levels of public 
goods. The city is home to a host of  French nationals who provide most of the skilled 
labor and expertise in extracting and marketing oil. Shops in the city display an 
impressive array of foreign luxury goods. In his book “Untapped: The Scramble for 
Africaʼs Oil,” John Ghazvinian describes a grocery store in Libreville selling high quality 
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23 "CIA - The World Factbook." Welcome to the CIA Web Site — Central Intelligence Agency. Web. 21 Dec. 2011. 
<cia.gov>.
24 "Oil Corruption in Equatorial Guinea - NYTimes.com." Energy and Environment - Green Blog - NYTimes.com. 9 
July 2009. Web. 21 Dec. 2011. <http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/09/oil-corruption-in-equatorial-guinea/ >.
foods, mostly imported from Europe. Strangely, the store sells no bananas- a staple of 
local production before the oil boom. Today, bananas are no longer a profitable 
enterprise in Gabon and domestically grown bananas are almost impossible to find in 
the capital because of extreme currency appreciation. Instead, bananas are imported 
from neighboring Cameroon while fruit is left rotting on trees in Gabonʼs interior. The 
country currently imports approximately 60% of its food supply. Importing food has 
detrimental effects on the poor in Gabon, many of whom relied on agriculture as their 
primary source of income. While the rich collect rents from oil, the poor no longer have 
the ability to scratch out even a meager income. While GDP per capita in the country 
ranks at nearly $6,500, well above the average in Sub-Saharan Africa, 40% of Gabonʼs 
citizens are unemployed and 66% live on less than one dollar a day.25 
Economic effects of Foreign Aid
! Oil and other natural resources can inflate currencies and hurt the non-resource 
sectors of an economy. Foreign aid can also generate currency appreciation that has 
detrimental effects similar to natural resources. The World Bank found that exchange 
rates in African countries are overvalued, which appears to be a combination of 
appreciation from resources and from aid flows.26 Currency appreciation can restrict 
growth in manufacturing sectors, robbing the country of much needed employment 
outside of the subsistence agriculture sector and making the country increasingly 
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dependent on aid. Aid negatively affects the production of tradable goods in recipient 
economies through two mechanisms: a substitution and a pricing effect. 
# A prototypical example of the substitution effect is Malawiʼs fledgeling textile 
industry, a fast growing sector which was largely derailed by an influx of donations from 
would-be-philanthropists in Northern Europe after trade liberalizations in 1994. 
Scandinavian aid organizations have been shipping second-hand clothing to the 
Southeast African countries of Malawi, Tanzania, and Mozambique under the banner of 
foreign assistance. Donated articles of clothing are sold at rock bottom prices on street 
corners all around Malawi. Low price clothing sold for a few cents has practically 
monopolized the Malawian clothing market.
# Malawians, however, are not in dire need of clothing. In fact, Malawi, like most 
countries in the region, had a burgeoning textile industry that produced clothes at 
reasonable prices and employed thousands. The influx of donated goods has 
dominated the textile industry and driven domestic manufacturers out of business. An 
estimated 40,000 Africans have lost their jobs due to low cost imports of textiles that the 
citizens did not need.27  
Pricing Effect of Foreign Aid
# The substitution effect of incoming foreign aid is readily apparent. Not as 
obvious, however, is the mechanism by which inflows of foreign aid unrelated to the 
textile sector can still negatively affect the textile industryʼs productivity and 
competitiveness. Macroeconomic effects related to incoming aid act like Dutch Disease, 
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inflating the cost of domestic goods compared to international alternatives and 
negatively affecting competitiveness. 
# To use an example, say that international donors funded the construction of a 
school in Malawi. Aid dollars donated from abroad would be used to hire laborers and 
purchase building materials. Once it was constructed, aid dollars would provide a wage 
for teachers and purchase textbooks and other basic materials to cover operating costs. 
On the surface, this allocation of aid resources seems only to have positive 
consequences. Increased education serves as investment in human capital which can 
improve productivity and strengthen democracy in future periods.
# When many aid projects are aggregated together, however, the results are not as 
innocuous. On the macro level, this type of spending can hurt domestic competitiveness 
and destroy jobs in the manufacturing sector. Employment in the service sector 
increases, but much of service sector wages originate with and depend on foreign aid. 
As a result, aid spending on the aggregate makes a country less connected to the 
global economy and increases reliance on aid inflows.
# Several mechanisms contribute to the negative macroeconomic effects a school 
can have on manufacturing and other export-oriented industries. First, building a school 
will divert skilled labor away from the manufacturing industry. The construction of the 
school will require an educated contractor and other skilled laborers to construct. Once 
built, the school will employ teachers and administrators. The school has increased the 
demand for skilled labor in the country. Higher demand translates to higher wages. 
While this is a boon for skilled laborers, export industries are harmed because skilled 
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laborers are diverted away from factories. To keep their workers, factories are forced to 
pay higher wage- raising production costs and lowering competitiveness. 
# Skilled labor is not the only factor of production that will become more expensive. 
To build a school, aid dollars will purchase building materials and other scarce domestic 
products. Like with skilled labor, this raises domestic prices of scarce resources, forcing 
up input costs for the manufacturers. 
# Finally, like with natural resources, foreign aid inflows alter a countryʼs current 
account balance and artificially raise the costs of production. Foreign aid primarily 
constitutes imports that a country does not pay for. Excess imports can skew a natural 
current account balance, where exports are used to pay for imports. When this equation  
changes and imports now exceed exports, exports behave as if they are more valuable 
than they actually are. The set of exports are used to acquire an artificially large set of 
imports. 
# The way this effect is manifested depends on the structure of a countryʼs 
currency. In a fixed-exchange rate economy, the imbalance in the current account will 
raise domestic prices of vital domestic goods through the mechanisms discussed 
above. Rising domestic prices caused by the current account imbalance increase prices 
on international markets and lower competitiveness. 
# Alternatively, in flexible exchange rate economies, aid inflows simply push up the 
nominal exchange rate. A higher exchange rate makes domestically produced goods 
more expensive compared to those produced abroad.  
# Several studies have attempted to tease out the effects of aid and natural 
resources on currency rate overvaluation. The most successful is Rajan and 
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Subramanian (2005), which calculates a currencyʼs overvaluation by comparing a 
countryʼs per capita income level to its actual price level relative to the United 
States.The paper finds that aid and currency overvaluation are positively correlated over 
time. It also found that overvaluation caused non-export sectors and capital intensive 
industries to grow much faster than export-oriented sectors of the economy. This is 
exactly the result that the model predicts, and goes a long way towards convincingly 
demonstrating that aid suffers from aggregate macroeconomic side-effects nearly 
identical to Dutch Disease. 
The Economic Solution
# A macroeconomic solution fits the observed conditions that contribute to the 
resource and aid curses. The negative externality of Dutch Disease has nearly identical 
effects in both economies based on natural resources and those reliant on foreign aid. 
Moreover, the negative side effect that causes a lack of growth is directly related to the 
quantity of aid received. These effects on the macroeconomic level serve to negate the 
positive gains associated with excess income.
# Aid inducing Dutch Disease further solidifies the idea that foreign aid and natural 
resource curses are identical at a fundamental level. Both curses are fundamentally 
caused by macroeconomic repercussions derived from unearned income. While 
adverse effects caused by unknowns and from distortions to political incentives have 
the potential to limit the benefits derived from windfall income, ubiquitous economic 
effects actively negate positive aspects of windfall income.
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Table 1. 
Aspects of Oil 
and Foreign Aid 
In Weak States In Strong States
Currency 
Exchange Rates
Aid- appreciated currency, 
hurts local industry and 
increases dependence
Oil- Dutch Disease
Aid- Governments able to 
judge what aid is needed. Does 
not increase dependence
Oil- Proper Monetary Policy 
counters Dutch Disease
Money for 
discretionary 
Spending
Aid and Oil- allocations 
generate Grievances among 
those who are not reaping 
the benefits of income 
Aid and Oil- government 
spending on public goods and 
lower taxes appeases citizens 
and interest groups
Incentives to 
Rebel 
Oil- Rebels can exploit 
resource owners for funding 
for revolts.
Aid- Wars will provide inflows 
of humanitarian aid, which 
can be controlled by rebel 
factions
Oil- Asset Specificity raise 
incentives for elites to invest in 
regime stability
Aid- Conditionality promises to 
eliminate inflows of aid, placing 
a premium on stability
Response to 
Unknowns
Oil- resource prices fluctuate 
on international markers 
Aid- government budget 
relies on unpredictable donor 
behavior in a certain year, 
Governments can fall into a 
moral hazard conundrum
Oil- Governments act 
responsibly and hedge income 
from booms to support the 
economy when prices are low. 
Aid- Governments avoid moral 
hazard
Section V: Sector Growth Fluctuations
! The economic-based mechanism theory presented above describes foreign aid 
and natural resources as contributing to service sector growth while repressing the 
manufacturing sector. Such a development path is out of sync with how countries have 
traditionally developed. It bears questioning whether such a path is capable of 
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sustaining long-term growth. It is possible that windfall income artificially inflates the size 
of the service sector, which will contract if windfall income is depleted.  
# Countries usually developed with traditional sector growth patterns. A country 
begins with dependence almost exclusively on agriculture. As technology increases 
productivity and incomes rise, demand for food is satiated and demand for industrial 
goods go up. The countryʼs industrialization period begins. Industrialization lasts until 
the populationʼs demands become less material, generating the need for services. As 
the country continues to grow, services account for an ever growing portion of the 
economy.28 Most developed countries have very large portions of their GDP derived 
from services- in 2010, the United Statesʼs service sector accounts for 78% of its GDP.29 
Figure 1: Traditional Development Path for an emerging economy30
27
28 World Bank, Growth of the Service Sector, p51
29 World Bank Database
30 World Bank, Growth of the Service Sector, p51
# In the modern era, many countries have eschewed the traditional growth 
schema, skipped the manufacturing phase, and seen growth originate directly from the 
service sector. Part of this trend can be pegged to the fact that new technology, such as 
the internet, has allowed services which used to be non-tradable to be outsourced. 
While answering phones or doing paperwork is a traditional service, countries such as 
India are completing these tasks for foreigners. These services are essentially exports. 
Similarly, increased levels of international tourism pad the pockets of many developing 
countries. Tourist goods are considered services, yet the money spent on them comes 
from abroad.31 This wave of export-oriented services mimics the manufacturing phase 
and precipitates a second influx of more traditional, domestic-oriented services. This 
resembles a traditional path of producing first then transitioning slowly to demanding 
consumption of traditional services.
# Service growth is fueled by windfall income. Foreign aid and oil dollars enable a 
countryʼs service sector to grow without any previous growth in manufacturing. Windfalls 
raise domestic prices and hurt competitiveness, leading to a decrease in an economyʼs 
ability to produce tradable goods. Conversely, the inflow of money in the economy 
raises the income of producers of non-tradable goods. In essence, inflowing windfall 
income allows a poor country to mimic their more productive neighbors who have the 
income to support higher levels of services. 
# The literature largely ignores the differences in sector growth among economies. 
Divides are clearly visible, however, in todayʼs global economy. China and many other 
East Asian developing economies have taken the more traditional approach, with 
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manufacturing led growth leading the economyʼs transition. In many other emerging 
economies, industry is not the driving force of development.
Is there a difference between service led and manufacturing led growth? 
# Prior to the current period, there are very few examples of countries developing 
based on growth in the service sector. Whether or not service sector led growth is a 
positive or a negative, the current trend is certainly unique. 
# In countries experiencing industrially led growth, reliance on manufactures can 
lead to economies of scale which encourage mass production and lowers production 
costs. For poor countries, inputs such as labor are relatively cheap, which gives a 
comparative advantage on international markets. Because a country has the potential to 
sell goods to the entire world, they can produce on a global scale.32 Services, on the 
other hand, cannot in most cases achieve economies of scale and can only reach 
limited domestic markets. Services can be seen as increasing standards of living, but in 
most cases not creating the basis for future growth.
# Both the service and industrial sectors have the potential to generate growth and 
raise income. However, services, especially traditional services aimed for local 
consumption, will not perpetuate long term growth. 
# It is possible that for firms to be competitive abroad with their manufactures, they 
must first have certain prerequisites for production such as working utilities, 
communication technology, and the ability to transport goods to markets. These 
prerequisites may only be attainable via foreign assistance. Additionally, services such 
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as  education and public health institutions can raise the quality of labor in the 
workforce. The existence of a solid service economy could lay the groundwork that 
makes future industry possible. As the economy transitions and becomes less 
dependent on windfall income, manufacturing slowly replaces services. This leads to 
sustained growth, transposing onto a traditional growth path. Evidence of these adverse 
conditions are reflected in Africaʼs low labor productivity rates, which are only around 
half of what they are on average in East Asia.33 If windfall income can fix conditions that 
trap poor economies, then growth in basic service sectors may be necessary for growth 
in other sectors. 
# The trend towards services instead of manufactures could also derive from poor 
governing institutions. Firms run into trouble when faced with overbearing government 
regulations. Firms that produce either traditional services or manufactures for domestic 
consumption often run unlicensed to avoid costly regulations. Schnieder, Buehn, and 
Montenegro (2010) estimate that the unlicensed, or shadow, economy of Sub-Saharan 
Africa could be as large as 38% of the regions total economy.34 35 This being said, when 
asked to name their most substantial obstacle to doing business, African business 
owners across the continent responded that their two biggest concerns were stable 
supplies of electricity and access to finance, which polled at 41% and 30% respectively. 
Governmental factors such as tax rates, crime, licensing, and political instability scored 
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34 Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro (2010) 
35 Informal economies may be partially driven by the distribution and sale of donated foreign goods, such as with 
textiles in Malawi. 
a combined 18%. The remaining 10% cited competition from the informal sector as the 
most substantial barrier to business.36
# While windfall income can develop a nationʼs service sector, many of those 
services will stop being profitable should windfall income dwindle. This precipitates a 
situation where windfall-dependent nations become dangerously reliant on either natural 
resources or foreign aid, with an economy that threatens to collapse if windfalls are shut 
off. Furthermore, if aid does discourage manufacturing, then donors can be seen as 
unintentionally damaging the traditional engine for emerging economies. Rajan and 
Subramanian state: “Manufacturing exports provided the vehicle for [a fast growing 
economyʼs] growth take-off, so any adverse effects on such exports should prima facie 
be a cause for concern about the effects of aid on growth.”37#
# To disprove that the service sector can lead to sustained long-term growth is 
beyond the scope of this paper. It is possible that basic services funded by windfall 
income are essential for providing a country with the tools to extricate themselves from 
a poverty trap. Conversely, one could also argue that manufacture-led growth would 
have already laid the groundwork for sustained growth if windfall dollars had not raised 
prices and lowered competitiveness. Instead, this paper seeks to identify and quantify 
the relationship between windfall income and growth in specific sectors. The main 
hypothesis tested is that both natural resources and foreign aid promote growth in the 
service sector of an economy while repressing growth in the manufacturing sector. 
Implications from such a finding could provide a solid answer for why aid and natural 
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resources fail to facilitate growth. It could also impact future aid policy and inform efforts 
to provide responsible assistance to less developed countries. 
Section VI: Data Analysis
# The effect of aid on the economy is tricky to measure. Several biases are present 
in traditional attempts to quantify the effect. First, aid is frequently increased in times of 
crisis. Much like how police officers are deployed to deal with increased crime levels, 
aid could be endogenous with failure because donations occur precisely because the 
country is in a political or economic crisis. Secondly, aid can be given not to boost 
development but to reinforce an alliance. The top two recipients of American aid are 
Egypt and Israel, neither of which need the aid for development purposes per se. 
Finally, for the basic case of aid, there is not a control group for aid recipients. If I find 
that countries receiving aid grow at a certain rate, there is little to suggest this rate is 
divergent from the unobservable, untreated outcome. Such a test has no power to 
estimate the effects of windfall income. 
# Additionally, the data does not always reflect the total damage to manufacturing 
sectors from windfall income. Natural resources are frequently used to fund transfers 
that boost other industries. Therefore some countries may have artificially created 
manufacturing growth. The windfall income curse may actively skew the economy in an 
unobservable fashion.38 
# My data breaks down an economy into broad sectors in order to be able to track 
a nationʼs development path. I begin by trying to show the effects of aid and resources 
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separately, to verify that each has a similar effect on the growth of economic sectors.  
After, I combine both phenomena into one regression, using aid and resource levels and 
fluctuations to try to predict the size of the manufacturing and service sectors and their 
change over time. 
# These goals are in line with previous work by Rajan and Subramanian (2009), 
who looked empirically at the effects of aid (and only aid) on economic sectors. While 
Rajan and Subramanian found results that support the hypothesis that aid is correlated 
with service sector growth while hurting competitiveness, their data only spans the 
range of the early 1980ʼs to the late 1990ʼs. My data set adds data from 2000-2010, not 
only adding more range to the study but including a period in which Sub-Saharan Africa 
(the most aid-dependent region in the world) has actually seen significant levels of 
growth and country stability absent from earlier decades. Regardless of previous 
significance, new trends may have emerged in the last few years.
# Rajan and Subramanian (2009) attempt to arrive at a conclusion that aid affects 
exchange rates. They use data estimating an economyʼs departure from long-run PPP, 
compiling estimates of prices inside countries and analyzing how they differ from 
globally estimated prices. This requires differentiating between what is unfounded 
appreciation and what is natural growth in prices induced by the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect, which posits that real exchange rate grows with real income.39 Rajan and 
Subramanian then control for multiple other policies besides foreign aid that could 
possible affect exchange rates. 
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# While the approach used by Rajan and Subramanian (2009) yields results, their 
research makes numerous assumptions. In this model, I present the correlation as a 
much simpler trend: high levels of foreign aid and natural resources result in service 
sector growth and manufacturing sector stagnation. To illustrate this trend, I employ 
simple macroeconomic cross-country data to attempt to illustrate such a correlation. 
While I sacrifice some power to make causal statements, my model is less convoluted 
and more able to make a simple, concise demonstration of how windfall income affects 
sector growth. 
# In Table 2, I show the effects of foreign aid on growth in the service and 
manufacture sector. I define aid as based on the percentage of GNI, which makes 
sense for the study because I am interested in the total amount of domestic income that 
is attributed to aid. The aid statistic includes military aid, disaster relief, UN intervention 
forces, and more traditional  development assistance. I choose this measure because 1) 
the data are more readily available across a broad spectrum of countries and time 
periods and 2) every incoming dollar that boosts internal consumption can, according to 
the logic presented in this paper, hurt competitiveness. The downside of this  approach 
is that this opens up the data to susceptibility to outliers. For instance, Liberia in 2010 
received 127.5% of its GNI in total foreign aid. Iraq received 78.8% in 2005. Of these 
two observations, Iraq can be easily dismissed because it was being occupied by 
foreign troops at the time. Liberia in 2010, however, was enjoying significant economic 
growth. The extreme number actually reflects how aid dependent Liberia was during this 
period. Even if accurate, extreme observations present barriers to clean regression 
results. 
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# In regressing manufacturing and service growth on aid, I am interested in two 
distinct characteristics of aid: how much aid is the country receiving on average, and 
whether or not the level of aid has increased or decreased. Theoretically, a country 
which went from low levels of aid to high levels of aid would experience a decrease in 
the manufacturing share of its income. However, a country which was already aid 
dependent at the start of the sample and gradually became less dependent would be 
expected to become comparably more competitive internationally in 2010 than in 1980, 
leading to perhaps a larger manufacturing sector. If a country stays relatively constant in 
its aid dependence, I would expect a relatively constant depressed level of 
manufacturing.
# This is complicated by the fact that in most developing economies, the share of 
the economy devoted to agriculture declined significantly from 1980 to 2010. In a 50 
country sample,40 agricultureʼs share of the economy in 2010 represented only 64.6% of 
what it represented in 1980. Services have largely made up the difference, with the 
average service sector increasing by 25.1%.41 Manufactures and resources have both 
remained relatively constant (at 102.2% and 91.8% of 1980 levels respectively). With 
constant aid, manufacturing and service sector growth may occur simultaneously as a 
function of dwindling agricultural importance. Meanwhile, services are becoming 
increasingly important, especially in nations that are experiencing the traditional 
transition towards services after the industrial phase of development. 
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foods and manufactured goods are relatively satiated and the globe is moving now towards higher 
production of services. 
# Unfortunately, the data that I am working with is far from perfect. After screening 
for basic data inclusion and excluding countries that are either considered developed 
(over $10,000 GDP per capita) or too small (under 700 km^2), the data set dwindles to 
101 countries. Only 50 of these countries had all values for the size of four sectors, 
Agriculture, Service, Manufacturing, and Resources, over the thirty year period. 
# However, even for the these countries the data is susceptible at best. The 
measurement techniques of the data made available by the World Data bank splits the 
economy into sectors and assigns each sector a percentage. These percentages, 
unfortunately, seldom add to 100%. Sector data ranges from accounting for only 80% of 
the economy to as much as 115%. Some of this variation is expected. Manufacturing is 
a subset of Industry in the World DataBankʼs data, meaning that other industry such as 
mining and construction are not included in the summation. However, observations 
above 100% are completely unjustified. While I reject some of the most extreme 
observations, I have no choice but to make due with the majority of the flawed data. I 
am forced to assume that these errors are random and normally distributed across 
countries, but that errors are consistent across time and within each country. If the 
measurements are calculated erroneously but consistently, I am still able to compare 
changes to the data over time. Most individual data I have examined in depth reveal 
relatively smooth sector growth rates which indicates consistency among samples. 
There is a overarching shift across time of percentage totals, with countries averaging 
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95.6% explained in 1980 but only 91.8% in 2010 (out of the 50 nations with all data for 
sectors reported).42 
# Table 2 represents the correlation of average levels of resources as a percentage 
of GDP and the average level of total Aid as a percentage of GNI, from 1980 to 2010, 
with changes in both the the manufacturing and service sectors. The purpose of these is 
to see how increasing levels of aid and resources affect the changing composition of its 
economy.
# The results show limited support for the theory that high levels of foreign aid can 
shrink the manufacturing sector of an economy while expanding the service sector. In 
the first regression of table 2, which regresses manufacturing growth on average aid 
and the increase dummy, shows that almost no correlation exists between average 
levels of aid and manufacturing growth. What is does indicate is that, with 95% 
confidence, increasing levels of aid are correlated with decreasing levels of 
manufacturing. The second regression tells a similar story with the service sector. 
Average levels of aid are not significant- and in fact the sign of the average aid 
coefficient is negative, which runs contrary to the expected results- but the regression 
expects that countries with increasing levels of aid to experience 8.6 percentage points 
more service sector growth than countries with decreasing levels. It should be noted 
that these results are associated by a lower level of significance. 
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economy not explained by Agriculture, Resources, or Manufacturing. I strongly disagree with this approach, as it 
lumps all the error terms for sectors into the one variable we are trying to explain. Another approach, which is more 
feasible, would to normalize the percentages by a constant so that they reach 100% exactly. As such, I chose to leave 
the values be in an attempt to preserve the consistency of the data. 
Figure 2. 
** The charts above shows sector growth for countries with significant reliance on either aid or natural 
resource income. ʻ1ʼ refers to a country with an increasing level of Aid or Resource reliance. ʻ0ʼ indicates 
a decreasing level of reliance
# There are many other explanations besides the one outlined by this paper for 
why these trends appear. The sample size used here is relatively small, with many aid-
dependent countries unused purely because of lack of data. Many of these countries 
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have experienced significant political turbulence in the last 30 years that could explain 
differences in growth. Furthermore, as discussed previously, there is reason to doubt 
the integrity of the data presented and there are potentially important variables missing 
from the regression. Reverse causality could also be driving results, with raising 
manufacturing levels resulting in lower need for foreign assistance. This being said, the 
results above suggest that the theory of aidʼs impact on sector growth is not empirically 
unfounded, and deserves closer evaluation.
Table 2.
# #   Aid/Man#  Aid/Serv# Oil/Man# Oil/Serv 
(Intercept)          1.48              9.01            -4.63            19.31        
                         (1.37)            (4.52)          (7.70)          (16.29)      
AIDAVERAGE   -0.03     #    -0.40                               
                          (0.11)           (0.35)                              
AIDINCREASE  -4.34*           8.64                                
                          (1.77)           (5.52)                             
RESAVERAVE #  # # #  -0.03             -0.88
                                                # # (0.19)# #  (0.43)        
oo$RINCR    # # # #  1.95   # -5.69         
          ## # # # # (5.56) ## (11.51)       
__________________________________________________
R$^2$                 0.23              0.08           0.04               0.29          
Adj. R^2              0.17              0.02          -0.12               0.19          
Num. obs.            30                 36              15                  17       
#
# In regressions 3 and 4 of table 3, which present resource driven sector growth, 
results are not as forthcoming. The regressions indicate that high levels of natural 
resources inflate the manufacturing sector of the economy while depressing the service 
sector. Increasing levels of resource dependence act in the opposite direction. While the 
results have no significant power in regression 3, they are strongly significant in 
regression 4, with an R^2 value of 0.29. This result runs directly contrary to the theory 
presented, which hypothesizes that higher natural resource levels will support a thriving 
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service sector economy. However, with a sample size of only 17, and with the majority 
of observations clustered near the origin, it is hard to justify interpreting these results as 
accurate or significant in any way.  
# The data are flawed in another key way. While calculating the change in  
manufacture percentages, great care was taken to make sure that the movement was 
not directly correlated with movements of natural resources. Thus, manufacturing 
growth is calculated based on the non-resource sectors of the economy. This prevents a 
growth in resource wealth from indicating a decrease in all sectors despite none of the 
other sectors being affected by the shock. 
# While this precaution ensures that the manufacturing growth variable is not 
directly compromised by resource shifts, it does not help resources from being affected 
by manufacturing. A country that has constant resource income but sees an increase in 
manufacturing will record a decreasing level of natural resource dependence. 
Hypothesizing that decreasing natural resource levels will lead to higher levels of 
manufacturing could then be vacuously true, as it can be said to be caused by 
anomalies in the data. In table 3, I run an iteration of the regressions excluding the 
dummy variables indicating whether or not natural resources are increasing or 
decreasing in significance. The variable for average resources draws data from the 30 
year period and measures reliance on natural resources with relatively low correlation to 
other fluctuations in the economy.
! In table 3, I run regressions to predict changes in the size of the service and 
manufacturing sectors. Because of suspected endogeneity in the resource dummies, I 
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run a pair of regressions with and without these variables. The dummies are not 
significant and do little to alter the results of the equation. 
Table 3.
# #   MAN!1            SERV 1         MAN 2! SERV  2 
(Intercept) #  18.39***   #    15.64***#    17.91***#     6.32*** 
         #    # (1.23)  #    (3.48)     #    (1.24)             (3.56)      
RESAVG       -0.08                 -1.05***         0.05               -1.29*** 
                      (0.06)               (0.16)             (0.10)  #     (0.27)      
AIDAVG         -0.29*              -0.02              -0.33**           0.04        
                      (0.12)               (0.31)             (0.12)            (0.32)      
GDP2010       0.00*               0.00               0.00*              0.00        
                      (0.00)               (0.00)             (0.00)        #    (0.00)     
AINCR            -3.04                7.26              -2.11              6.02       
                       (2.30)              (6.45)             (2.34)            (6.48)      
ADECR           -3.17               -2.02              -2.67             -2.41      
                       (1.71)             (4.81)              (1.70)            (4.85)      
RDECR                                                         -6.91#     14.86       
                              # # #               (3.97)            (11.18)     
RINCR                                                          -0.31              0.67        
                                                                     (1.81)           (5.06) 
__________________________________________________  
R$^2$             0.35                 0.42               0.39               0.44        
Adj. R^2          0.31                 0.37               0.33               0.37        
Num. obs.        81                     67                 81                  67          
# Measuring manufacturing growth, the average level of aid is statistically 
significant and negatively associated with manufacturing growth while the distinction 
between increasing or decreasing levels of aid are insignificant. The coefficient of both 
regressions are negative, showing that significant amounts of aid is associated with 
lower  manufacturing growth. Service sector growth shows the exact opposite 
significance pattern, with average aid being insignificant but with substantial difference 
between countries with increasing and decreasing levels of aid. Increasing aid results in 
estimated service sector growth 7.26 percentage points above countries not receiving 
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significant amounts of aid. Decreasing aid leads to levels of service sector growth below 
the expected level of countries without significant levels of aid. This result implies that 
not only is increasing aid able to accelerate a countryʼs sector growth, decreasing aid 
does not contribute to service growth. In essence, these figures if accurate indicate that 
service sector growth created by foreign aid income are not stable, and that the service 
sector is continually dependent on circulating foreign aid income to support an artificially 
elevated level of domestic service production. When foreign aid decreases, some of 
these services are no longer economically feasible. 
# These results lend cautious credibility to the theory that windfall income supports 
service sector growth while discouraging manufacturing sector growth. Stronger 
evidence can surprisingly be found linking aid to sector shifts, yet in previous works it 
has been the relationship between resource wealth and manufacturing failures that has 
received so much scholarly attention. Unfortunately, these results also leave me unable 
to quantifiably compare the natural resource curse and the curse of foreign aid. What I 
do have is empirical results that weakly show that foreign aid is associated with growth 
in the service sector while repressing growth in the manufacturing sector. Given the 
overall quality of the data used, the chaotic nature of the data set, the possibility of 
reverse causality and the relatively inconclusive results found, this analysis cannot be 
considered conclusive proof or denial of even a true correlation between aid or oil and 
sector growth, let alone a windfall income effect on the composition of an economy. 
Future research should attempt to strengthen these findings and look closer at the 
effects of foreign aid and natural resources on sector growth over time. Better data and 
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more stringent empirical analysis could tease out additional answers and strengthen our 
understanding of how the curse of windfall income functions.  
Conclusion
# Many economies in todayʼs world are heavily dependent on either inflows of 
foreign aid or natural resource income. While on the surface such inflows of windfall 
capital would conceivably help a struggling nation develop, the age-old adage ʻGive a 
man a fish and he will eat for a day; teach and man to fish and he will eat foreverʼ holds. 
Economies that are reliant on unearned windfall income are constrained from achieving 
growth. 
# Windfall capital can have negative effects through both political and economic 
mechanisms. Politically, windfall income distorts political incentives and can cause the 
deterioration of democratic institutions. In other cases, windfall income can destabilize 
nations and increase the chance of civil wars. While the severity of these effects is 
heavily dependent on pre-existing institutions, they can have serious negative effects on 
the quality of governance. Poor governance has the ability to constrain economic 
growth. 
# While political effects are substantial, it is economic mechanisms that provide the 
negative externality capable of explaining the ubiquitous failures of both aid and 
resources to create growth. Both aid inflows and resource income induce Dutch 
Disease in economies. Excess capital artificially elevates the value of a countryʼs 
currency and overvaluation makes export sectors less competitive and destroys 
manufacturing jobs. Dutch Disease narrows the scope of an economy and makes the 
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economy even more dependent on the the supply of windfall income. Empirical results 
offer limited support for this hypothesis, finding that average levels of aid are significant 
in determining manufacturing sector growth and that movement in the levels of foreign 
aid receives  significantly impacts the growth of the service sector. While the results are 
too weak to be considered conclusive, they do lend some credibility to the theory of a 
windfall income curse. 
# In looking at remedies for Dutch Disease and other harmful side-effects of foreign 
aid and natural resource dependence, researchers should note that both diseases stem 
from the same root cause- reliance on windfall income. The curse of windfall income 
incorporates both the resource curse and the curse of aid.
# This analysis leaves interesting questions regarding how best to manage an 
economy that is dependent on windfall income. Many countries caught in traps of 
windfall income dependence could see substantial benefits if they were able to institute 
reforms that could alleviate the effects of Dutch Disease. 
# First, the theory eliminates the feasibility of a ʻbig pushʼ solution such as 
proposed by Jeffrey Sachs. Sachs calls for a large increase in aid to create conditions 
where recipients reach a critical point at which consumption is satiated and is used for 
investment. Sachsʼ concept, which William Easterly also criticizes, would likely have the 
effect of destroying manufacturing jobs in recipient countries and making the country 
more dependent on future aid without actually contributing towards growth.43 
! Many previous efforts have been made to counter the resource curse with 
monetary policy that depreciates the value of a currency and maintains the 
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competitiveness of non-resource sector products at home and abroad. Good 
governance and fiscal responsibility by the government is needed to accomplish this 
goal. Even when good governance is present, monetary policy can still fail to make the 
manufacturing industry profitable. Resource-rich countries have aimed to use their vast 
oil revenues to finance diversified investments and to kickstart industrial development. 
Venezuelans referred to this “sowing the seeds of oil revenues.” In Venezuela, policies 
had little effect, and the government ended up effectively buying unproductive 
companies to keep them from going out of business. While economies can try to reform 
to avoid Dutch Disease, very few have been successful. Countries should consider 
either cutting back on resource dependence or focusing efforts on investing in goods 
that take high levels of capital to complete, such as research and development projects. 
# Aid dependent economies have a more straightforward verdict. Donors should 
focus on aid that will not contribute to Dutch Disease. Aid flows that will not induce a 
Dutch Disease mechanism include projects that employ factors of production that are 
not in scarce supply, such as unskilled labor. Another innocuous aid flow exists in capital 
goods, which can provide incentives for investment in economies but will not destroy 
competitiveness. Because they do not induce domestic fiscal expansions, they will not 
cause prices to be bid up and the currency exchange rate will not appreciate.44
# For countries that are highly dependent on windfall income, kicking dependency is 
likely to be a costly and unpredictable process. For many aid-dependent countries, 
donors slowly pull back funding to encourage countries to become independent. 
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However, as foreign aid inflows often have the effect of making countries more 
dependent, not less, on aid, this could have jarring effects. 
# In the future, as technology shocks either lower global demand for oil or when oil 
reserves begin to run out, expect to see high levels of turbulence in oil economies. The 
economy will be forced to quickly transition from being completely reliant on aid to 
suddenly having to develop legitimate non-resource export sectors. As it stands, such 
shocks would cripple a stateʼs service sector, which is usually heavily reliant on oil 
wealth to pay wages. Countries should implement policies to try to at least marginally 
diversify the economy and create viable production outside of the resource sector to 
mitigate potentially disastrous consequences in the future. 
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Apendix
Table 4. 
Variable Description
Agriculture Livestock and crop production, as well as forestry, fishing, and hunting. 
Manufacturing A subset of the industrial sector, manufacturing encompasses all exportable 
goods that a country produces. 
Services Value added in wholesale and retail trade, transport, government, financial, 
professional, and personal services such as education, health care, and real 
estate services, imputed bank service charges, and import duties
Natural Resources Value added by all oil, natural gas, mineral, coal, and forestry rents. Excludes 
mining. 
Aid/GNI Total aid dollars from all sources over Gross Natural Income
Average Aid The total amount of aid the country received from 1980 to 2010, over the total 
GNI from the same period (weighted by annual GNI)
Aid Increase A dummy variable signifying significant amounts of aid (Average Aid > 3%, 
with the average of the 1980 -1990 observations less than the average of the 
2000-2010 observations. 
Aid Decrease A dummy variable signifying significant amounts of aid (Average Aid > 3%, 
with the average of the 1980 -1990 observations higher than the average of the 
2000-2010 observations. 
Average Resources The total amount of natural resources the economy produced from 1980 to 
2010, over the total GDP from the same period. 
Resource Increase A dummy variable signifying significant amounts of resource (Average 
Resource > 10%, with the average of the 1980 -1990 observations less than the 
average of the 2000-2010 observations.
Resource Decrease A dummy variable signifying significant amounts of resource (Average 
Resource > 10%, with the average of the 1980 -1990 observations greater than 
the average of the 2000-2010 observations.
GDP Country GDP
Manufacturing 
Growth
The percent portion of the manufacturing sector of an economy  in 2010 less 
the percentage share in 1980. When measured in conjuncture with Natural 
Resources, the change of the share of the economy excluding Natural 
Resources is used in order to avoid direct endogeneity. 
Services Growth The percent portion of the service sector of an economy  in 2010 less the 
percentage share in 1980. When measured in conjuncture with Natural 
Resources, the change of the share of the economy excluding Natural 
Resources is used in order to avoid direct endogeneity. 
** All data from the World Data Bank
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Table 5.  Aid Dependent Countries, 1980-2010
Country Avg. Aid Increase Country Avg. Aid Increase
Liberia 40.11 1 Togo 9.71 0
Guinea-Bissau 31.68 0 Guinea 9.37 1
Mozambique 24.45 1 Kyrgyz Republic 9.02 0
Burundi 22.38 1 Lesotho 8.97 0
Malawi 21.16 1 Dominica 8.58 0
Sierra Leone 20.91 1 Papua New Guinea 8.06 0
Cape Verde 20.64 0 Congo, Rep. 8.04 1
Kiribati 19.45 0 Ghana 7.68 1
Rwanda 18.36 1 Jordan 7.59 0
Vanuatu 17.59 0 Nepal 7.46 0
Mauritania 16.31 0 Tajikistan 7.27 0
Comoros 15.64 0 Bolivia 6.95 0
Zambia 15.49 1 Honduras 6.70 0
Mali 15.13 0 Mongolia 6.13 1
Tanzania 14.43 1 Kenya 5.80 0
Tonga 14.31 0 Armenia 5.59 0
Niger 14.01 0 Georgia 5.36 0
Guyana 13.91 0 Zimbabwe 5.24 1
Burkina Faso 13.39 0 Sudan 5.01 0
Bhutan 13.07 0 Albania 4.84 1
Central African Republic 12.31 0 Cote d'Ivoire 4.77 0
Congo, Dem. Rep. 12.25 1 Cameroon 4.49 0
Uganda 12.23 1 Suriname 4.32 0
Lao PDR 11.10 1 Vietnam 3.75 1
Ethiopia 10.96 1 Sri Lanka 3.57 0
Madagascar 10.82 1 Belize 3.35 0
Benin 10.29 0 Bangladesh 3.19 0
Senegal 10.19 0 Macedonia, FYR 3.11 0
Chad 10.05 0 Namibia 3.06 1
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Table 6. Resource Dependent Countries, 1980-2010
Country Res/GDP Increase Country RES/GDP Increase
Congo, Rep. 55.0 0 Bhutan 15.8 1
Angola 47.1 0 Bolivia 15.1 1
Azerbaijan 46.5 0 Egypt, Arab Rep. 14.6 1
Saudi Arabia 44.4 1 Guinea 13.9 0
Gabon 42.4 0 Malaysia 13.8 1
Papua New Guinea 33.6 0 Mongolia 12.7 1
Venezuela, RB 29.7 1 Chile 12.2 1
Yemen, Rep. 29.6 0 Zambia 11.7 1
Iran, Islamic Rep. 29.3 0 Sudan 11.5 1
Chad 24.6 0 Guyana 11.0 1
Algeria 23.8 0 Indonesia 11.0 1
Syrian Arab Republic 21.6 0 Cameroon 10.8 1
Liberia 19.3 1 Vietnam 10.5 1
Mauritania 19.1 1 Burundi 10.0 1
Congo, Dem. Rep. 15.8 0
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Figure 3. 
**Chart identical to Figure 3 displaying data points as country codes for country identification. 
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Figure 4. 
** These charts illustrate sector movement across time (sectors normalized to add to 100%). Egypt and 
Indonesia both have solid manufacturing growth. Uganda has marginal manufacturing growth, but large 
service sector growth. Rwandaʼs growth is almost all attributed to services, what tiny portion of 
manufactures it did have has shrunk. Norway is a fully developed economy with a large service sector 
and significant resource levels. 
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